Industrial Organization (I)
Course Outline

General Information:

Course Hours: W 3:30-4:20, 4:30-5:20
Place: 社法研六
Contact Information: (Phone) 2782-2791 ext 506 (e-mail) myliang@econ.sinica.edu.tw

Grading:

Grades will be based on problem sets (50%) and a final exam (50%) .

Reference Books:

J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988.
Hart, O., Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995.
R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1989.

1. Theory of the Firm and Incomplete Contracts

1.1 Theory of the Firm

1.1.1 Holdup Problem

1.1.2 Ownership Contracts

1.1.3 Optimal Legal Rules for Breach Remedies

1.2 Criticisms of Incomplete Contracts I : Bargaining Solution

1.3 Criticisms of Incomplete Contracts II : Contract Solutions to Holdup

2. Market Structure and Competition

2.1 Durable Goods Monopoly

2.2 Oligopoly

2.3 Horizontal Mergers, Entry and Exit

2.4 Product Quality, Product Differentiation

2.5 Vertical Restraints

2.6 Price Discrimination

2.7 Consumer Search, Switching, Advertising, and Retailing