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課程名稱 |
專題討論上
Seminar (1) |
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開課學期 |
109-1 |
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授課對象 |
哲學系 |
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授課教師 |
吳澤玫 |
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課號 |
Phl4997 |
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課程識別碼 |
104 40801 |
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班次 |
01 |
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學分 |
1.0 |
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全/半年 |
全年 |
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必/選修 |
選修 |
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上課時間 |
星期四3(10:20~11:10) |
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上課地點 |
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備註 |
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。限已申請者選修。
限學士班四年級以上 且 限本系所學生(含輔系、雙修生)
總人數上限：1人 |
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Ceiba 課程網頁 |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1091Phl4997_01 |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
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課程大綱
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課程概述 |
人們如何做出道德判斷？除了哲學家，道德心理學家也嘗試回答這個問題。格林(Joshua Greene)根據心理學和神經科學的實證性研究，提出道德判斷的模型，並進一步提出規範倫理學的主張，為效益主義的道德理論辯護。本課程將探討格林的道德心理學理論和規範性主張，以及海特(Jonathan Haidt)和其他學者的相關論點。此外也將討論實證性研究是否能對「人們應該如何行為」的規範倫理學問題提供理論助益？道德心理學的研究如何影響我們對道德理論的思考？ |
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課程目標 |
1.瞭解格林的道德心理學與倫理學主張，以及其他學者的相關論點。
2.提升批判思考與論證建構能力。
3.將課程所學結合到自身的研究。 |
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課程要求 |
1.課前閱讀：須詳閱每週的指定閱讀文本，充分掌握相關論點之問題意識與理論主張，並撰寫論點摘要與提問。
2.課堂討論：針對文本內容、論證主張、疑惑不解之處或延伸問題進行討論。
3.期末報告：針對本課程之授課內容自選研究主題，撰寫學術性論文。 |
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
1.Haidt, J. (2012). The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion. New York: Pantheon.
2.Singer, P. (2005). “Ethics and Intuitions,” The Journal of Ethics 9, 3-4: 331-352.
3.Railton, P. (2014). “The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement,” Ethics 124, 4: 813-859.
4.Greene, J. D. (2003). “From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral ‘Ought’: What Are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4: 847-850.
5.Greene, J. D. (2008b). “Reply to Mikhail and Timmons.” In W.Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology: Vol. 3. The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development. (Pp. 105-117). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
6.Greene, J. D. (2013). Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them. New York: Penguin Press.
7.Greene, J. D. (2014). “Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)science Matters for Ethics,” Ethics 124, 4: 695-726.
8.Berker, S. (2009). “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 37, 4: 293-329.
9.Kahane, G. (2012). “On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Judgment,” Mind and Language 27: 519-545.
10.Timmons, M. (2008). “Toward a Sentimentalist Deontology.” In W.Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology: Vol. 3. The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development. (Pp. 93-104). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
11.Kumar, V., & Campbell, R. (2012). “On the Normative Significance of Experimental Moral Psychology,” Philosophical Psychology 25, 3: 311-330.
12.Kamm, F. M. (2009). Neuroscience and Moral Reasoning: A Note on Recent Research. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 37, 4: 330-345.
13.Kahane, G., Wiech, K., Shackel, N., Farias, M., Savulescu, J., & Tracey, I. (2012). “The Neural Basis of Intuitive and Counterintuitive Moral Judgment,” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 7, 4: 393-402.
14.Paxton, J. M., Bruni, T., & Greene, J. D. (2013). “Are ‘Counter-Intuitive’ Deontological Judgments Really Counter-Intuitive?: An Empirical Reply to Kahane et al. (2012),” Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience 9, 9: 1368-1371.
15.Huang, K., Greene, J. D., & Bazerman, M. (2019). “Veil-of-Ignorance Reasoning Favors the Greater Good,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 116, 48: 23989-23995. |
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參考書目 |
1.Christensen, J. F., Flexas, A., Calabrese, M., Gut, N. K., & Gomila, A. (2014). “Moral Judgment Reloaded: A Moral Dilemma Validation Study,” Frontiers in Psychology 5, 607.
2.Greene, J. D. (2008). “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul.” In W.Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology: Vol. 3. The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development. (Pp. 35-80). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
3.Greene, J. D., L. E. Nystrom, et al. (2004). “The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment,” Neuron 44, 2: 389-400.
4.Greene, J. D., S. A. Morelli, et al. (2008). “Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment,” Cognition 107: 1144-1154.
5.Haidt, J. (2001). “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review 108: 814-834.
6.Shalvi, S., Eldar, O., & Bereby-Meyer, Y. (2012). “Honesty Requires Time (and Lack of Justifications),” Psychological Science 23, 10: 1264-1270.
7.Sidgwick, H. (1907). The Methods of Ethics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company Incorporated.
8.Suter, R. & Hertwig, R. (2011). “Time and Moral Judgment,” Cognition 119, 3: 454-458.
9.Klein, C. (2011). “The Dual Track Theory of Moral Decision-Making: A Critique of the Neuroimaging Evidence,” Neuroethics 4: 143-162.
10.Alfano, M., Loeb, D. & Plakias, A. (2018). “Experimental Moral Philosophy,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/experimental-moral
11.Doris, J., Stich, S., Phillips, J. & Walmsley, L. (2020). “Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/moral-psych-emp |
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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No. |
項目 |
百分比 |
說明 |
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1. |
指定閱讀之摘要與提問 |
25% |
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2. |
課堂討論表現 |
25% |
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3. |
期末報告 |
50% |
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週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
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第1週 |
9/17 |
Haidt, J. (2012). The Righteous Mind. Pp. xi-51.
Introduction
Ch1 Where Does Morality Come From?
Ch2 The Intuitive Dog and Its Rational Tail. |
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第2週 |
9/24 |
Haidt, J. (2012). The Righteous Mind. Pp. 52-92.
Ch3 Elephants Rule.
Ch4 Vote for Me (Here’s Why). |
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第3週 |
10/01 |
中秋節（放假） |
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第4週 |
10/08 |
1.Singer, P. (2005). “Ethics and Intuitions.” Pp. 331-352.
2.Greene, J. D. (2003). “From Neural "Is" to Moral ‘Ought’: What Are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?.” Pp. 847-850. |
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第5週 |
10/15 |
Railton, P. (2014). “The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement.” Pp. 813-859. |
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第6週 |
10/22 |
Greene, J. D. (2013). Moral Tribes. Pp. 1-65.
Introduction
Ch1 The Tragedy of the Commons.
Ch2 Moral Machinery. |
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第7週 |
10/29 |
Greene, J. D. (2013). Moral Tribes. Pp.66-143.
Ch3 Strife on the New Pastures.
Ch4 Trolleyology.
Ch5 Efficiency, Flexibility, and the Dual-Process Brain. |
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第8週 |
11/05 |
Greene, J. D. (2013). Moral Tribes. Pp. 147-208.
Ch6 A Splendid Idea.
Ch7 In Search of Common Currency.
Ch8 Common Currency Found. |
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第9週 |
11/12 |
期中綜合討論 |
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第10週 |
11/19 |
Greene, J. D. (2013). Moral Tribes. Pp. 211-285.
Ch9 Alarming Acts.
Ch10 Justice and Fairness. |
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第11週 |
11/26 |
Greene, J. D. (2013). Moral Tribes. Pp. 289-353.
Ch11 Deep Pragmatism.
Ch12 Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Six Rules for Modern Herders. |
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第12週 |
12/03 |
Berker, S. (2009). “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience.” Pp. 293-329. |
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第13週 |
12/10 |
Kahane, G. (2012). “On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Judgment. Mind and Language.” Pp. 519-545. |
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第14週 |
12/17 |
Greene, J. D. (2014). “Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)science Matters for Ethics.” Pp. 695-726. |
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第15週 |
12/24 |
Kumar, V., & Campbell, R. (2012). “On the Normative Significance of Experimental Moral Psychology.” Pp. 311-330. |
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第16週 |
12/31 |
1.Timmons, M. (2008). “Toward a Sentimentalist Deontology.” Pp. 93-104.
2.Greene, J. D. (2008b). “Reply to Mikhail and Timmons.” Pp. 105-117. |
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第17週 |
1/07 |
Kamm, F. M. (2009). Neuroscience and Moral Reasoning: A Note on Recent Research. Pp. 330-345. |
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第18週 |
1/14 |
1.Kahane, G., Wiech, K., Shackel, N., Farias, M., Savulescu, J., & Tracey, I. (2012). “The Neural Basis of Intuitive and Counterintuitive Moral Judgment.” Pp. 393-402.
2.Paxton, J. M., Bruni, T., & Greene, J. D. (2013). “Are ‘Counter-Intuitive’ Deontological Judgments Really Counter-Intuitive?: An Empirical Reply to Kahane et al. (2012).” Pp. 1368-1371.
3.Huang, K., Greene, J. D., & Bazerman, M. (2019). “Veil-of-Ignorance Reasoning Favors the Greater Good.” Pp. 23989-23995.
期末綜合討論 |
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