課程資訊
課程名稱
專題研究:可靠論與普遍性難題
Special Study: Reliabilism and the Generality Problem 
開課學期
106-2 
授課對象
文學院  哲學研究所  
授課教師
鄧敦民 
課號
Phl7867 
課程識別碼
124 M5960 
班次
 
學分
1.0 
全/半年
半年 
必/選修
選修 
上課時間
星期五2(9:10~10:00) 
上課地點
哲研討室三 
備註
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。請先徵得授課教師及申請者同意後,始得選課。
限碩士班以上 且 限本系所學生(含輔系、雙修生)
總人數上限:5人 
 
課程簡介影片
 
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課程概述

當代知識論關於證成性質的討論,內在論與外在論之爭,源自於知識的傳統分析:知識與僅僅是真信念的區別是什麼?根據知識的傳統分析,知識除了真信念之外,還需要再加上好理由,例如足夠的證據或夠強的背景作為知識的第三項條件,也就是證成。但是蓋提爾難題顯示出證成的真信念並沒有辦法避免將幸運猜測歸為知識,於是一些哲學家開始採取不同的進路,指出知識的關鍵,是信念與致真項之間的正確因果連接,這個立場更進一步地發展出可靠論與索真論。上述觀點可以大致區分為「好理由理論」與「因果理論」,粗略來說,兩者即分別對應至「內在論」與「外在論」。直至目前的主流發展,內在論的代表理論是證據論,外在論的代表理論是可靠論。
可靠論遭遇到許多攻擊,其中最被廣泛討論,也最致命的理論困難是「普遍性難題」:可靠的過程所產生的信念即是被證成的信念,但可靠性要如何判斷?可靠論者必須提出挑出「相關類型」的方法才能夠計算可靠度。另一方面,證據論所遇到的主要挑戰是:何謂證據?證據是如何支持信念的?證據論必須提供一個解釋以說明證據以及證據與信念之間的關係,否則會是空的理論。
普遍性難題受到非常多的討論,許多可靠論者皆試圖提出回應,但其背後的深度尚未受到討論。本課程將分析可靠論者對於普遍性難題的回應,並將其區分為三種主要類型:找尋相關類型、迴避回應,以及訴諸認知科學,加以仔細檢驗,並藉由深入討論進一步指出其背後的的問題。
The epistemological debate about justification between internalism and externalism originates from the traditional analysis of knowledge: What distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief? According to the traditional analysis, a true belief has to satisfy a third condition to be qualified as knowledge: there has to be good reason, namely, justification. But the Gettier problem shows that even justified true belief may fail to exclude lucky guess, which has led to some alternative approaches that emphasize the right causal connections such as reliabilism or tracking theories. So we have a division between ‘good reason’ accounts and ‘causal’ accounts, roughly corresponding to internalism and externalism respectively. The main internalist account is evidentialism, and the main externalist account is reliabilism.
Reliabilism has faced many challenges, including the widely discussed ‘generality problem’: How should we determine a ‘relevant type’ so as to calculate reliability? On the other hand, Evidentialism also faces its own challenges: What is evidence? How does evidence support beliefs? Evidentialism needs an account for the relationship between evidence and belief.
The generality problem is widely discussed, and there have been many attempted responses in the literature, but its significance is still not fully appreciated. This course will examine the reliabilist responses to the generality problem: the relevant-type response, the parrying responses, and the responses that invoke cognitive science, and will examine the problems behind these responses.
 

課程目標
使學生能掌握內外在論正反兩方的主要論證,並期望學生能在評估這些論證後提出自己的立場。
In the end of the course, students are expected to fully comprehend the main arguments in the debate, and to propose their own positions after examining these arguments.
 
課程要求
採一對一方式進行,定期就指定閱讀內容提出報告進行討
論,並於期末提出研究報告。
 
預期每週課後學習時數
 
Office Hours
 
指定閱讀
Conee E., & Feldman R. (1998). The generality problem for reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):1-29
Alston, William P. (1995). How to Think about Reliability. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):1-29.
Bishop, Michael A. (2010). Why the generality problem is everybody's problem. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298.
Earl Conee. 2013. “The specifucity of the generality problem.” Philosophical Studies: 163(3): 751-762
Levin, Michael (2002). Is the Generality Problem too General? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):87 - 97
Dutant, Julien & Olsson, Erik J. (2013). Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem? Erkenntnis 78 (6):1347-1365.
Comesaña, Juan (2006). A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27-47.
Feldman R., & Conee E. (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15-34.
Matheson, Jonathan D. (2015). Is there a well-founded solution to the generality problem? Philosophical Studies 172 (2):459-468.
Comesaña, Juan (2010). Evidentialist Reliabilism. Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
Tolly, Jeffrey (2017). A defense of parrying responses to the generality problem. Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1935-1957.
Olsson, Erik J. (2016). A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem.
Jönsson, Martin L. (2013). A reliabilism built on cognitive convergence: An empirically grounded solution to the generality problem. Episteme 10 (3):241-268.
Wunderlich, Mark E. (2003). Vector reliability: A new approach to epistemic justification. Synthese 136 (2):237 - 262.
Conee, Earl & Feldman, Richard (2001). Internalism defended. In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Blackwell. pp. 1-18.
Beebe, James (2004). The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis. Noûs 38 (1):177 - 195.
Becker, Kelly (2008). Epistemic luck and the generality problem. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.
McCain, Kevin (2016). The Nature of Scientific Knowledge: An Explanatory Approach. Springer.
 
參考書目
Alston, William P. (1995). How to Think about Reliability. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):1-29.
Armstrong, D. M. (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Becker, Kelly (2008). Epistemic luck and the generality problem. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.
Beebe, James (2004). The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis. Noûs 38 (1):177 - 195.
Bishop, Michael A. (2010). Why the generality problem is everybody's problem. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298.
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1957). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
Comesaña, Juan (2006). A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27-47.
Comesaña, Juan (2010). Evidentialist Reliabilism. Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
Earl Conee. 2013. “The specifucity of the generality problem.” Philosophical Studies: 163(3): 751-762
Conee E., & Feldman R. (1998). The generality problem for reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):1-29.
Conee, Earl & Feldman, Richard (2001). Internalism defended. In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Blackwell. pp. 1-18.
Feldman R., & Conee E. (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15-34.
Gettier, Edmund L. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Erkenntnis 23 (6):121.
Goldman, Alvin (1979). What is Justified Belief? In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
James, William (1897). The Will to Believe. In The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.. pp. 1-15.
Jönsson, Martin L. (2013). A reliabilism built on cognitive convergence: An empirically grounded solution to the generality problem. Episteme 10 (3):241-268.
Levin, Michael (2002). Is the Generality Problem too General? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):87 - 97.
Malcolm, Norman (1952). Knowledge and belief. Mind 61 (242):178-189.
Matheson, Jonathan D. (2015). Is there a well-founded solution to the generality problem? Philosophical Studies 172 (2):459-468.
Nozick, Robert (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 14 (41):87-93.
Olsson, Erik J. (2016). A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem.
Tolly, Jeffrey (2017). A defense of parrying responses to the generality problem. Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1935-1957.
Wunderlich, Mark E. (2003). Vector reliability: A new approach to epistemic justification. Synthese 136 (2):237 - 262.
 
評量方式
(僅供參考)
 
No.
項目
百分比
說明
1. 
課堂討論 
50% 
 
2. 
期末論文 
50% 
 
 
課程進度
週次
日期
單元主題
第1週
3/02  Conee E., & Feldman R. (1998). The generality problem for reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):1-29 
第2週
3/09  Alston, William P. (1995). How to Think about Reliability. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):1-29. 
第3週
3/16  Bishop, Michael A. (2010). Why the generality problem is everybody's problem. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298. 
第4週
3/23  Earl Conee. 2013. “The specifucity of the generality problem.” Philosophical Studies: 163(3): 751-762 
第5週
3/30  Levin, Michael (2002). Is the Generality Problem too General? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):87 - 97 
第6週
4/06  Dutant, Julien & Olsson, Erik J. (2013). Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem? Erkenntnis 78 (6):1347-1365. 
第7週
4/13  Comesaña, Juan (2006). A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27-47. 
第8週
4/20  Feldman R., & Conee E. (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15-34. 
第9週
4/27  Matheson, Jonathan D. (2015). Is there a well-founded solution to the generality problem? Philosophical Studies 172 (2):459-468. 
第10週
5/04  Comesaña, Juan (2010). Evidentialist Reliabilism. Noûs 44 (4):571-600. 
第11週
5/11  Tolly, Jeffrey (2017). A defense of parrying responses to the generality problem. Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1935-1957. 
第12週
5/18  Olsson, Erik J. (2016). A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem. 
第13週
5/25  Jönsson, Martin L. (2013). A reliabilism built on cognitive convergence: An empirically grounded solution to the generality problem. Episteme 10 (3):241-268. 
第14週
6/01  Wunderlich, Mark E. (2003). Vector reliability: A new approach to epistemic justification. Synthese 136 (2):237 - 262. 
第15週
6/08  Conee, Earl & Feldman, Richard (2001). Internalism defended. In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Blackwell. pp. 1-18. 
第16週
6/15  Beebe, James (2004). The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis. Noûs 38 (1):177 - 195. 
第17週
6/22  Becker, Kelly (2008). Epistemic luck and the generality problem. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366. 
第18週
6/29  McCain, Kevin (2016). The Nature of Scientific Knowledge: An Explanatory Approach. Springer.