課程資訊
課程名稱
 專題研究：公共理性的當代理論
Independent Study: Contemporary Theories of Public Reason 
開課學期
 109-1 
授課對象
 文學院  哲學研究所  
授課教師
 吳澤玫 
課號
 Phl7881 
課程識別碼
 124 M6100 
班次
  
學分
 1.0 
全/半年
 半年 
必/選修
 選修 
上課時間
 星期四6(13:20~14:10) 
上課地點
  
備註
 本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。請先徵得授課教師及申請者同意後,始得選課。
限碩士班以上 且 限本系所學生(含輔系、雙修生)
總人數上限：3人 
Ceiba 課程網頁
 http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1091Phl7881 
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課程概述

公共理性的概念規範公職人員和公民在討論重要政治議題時如何證成其支持的提案。羅爾斯(John Rawls)主張只有可合理期待所有人都會接受的政治價值，才能作為公共理由。高斯(Gerald F. Gaus)則主張人們可以訴諸基於全面性學說的不同理由。用來證成政治提案的理由是否包含某種共識？這涉及公共理性的結構，以及我們應該如何設想認可理由的公民：他們是「真實的人」還是「理想化的人」？本課程聚焦公共理性的結構，以及此結構中的人的理想化問題，將分析與評估不同觀點的合理性。 

課程目標
 1.瞭解當代政治哲學裡跟公共理性有關的討論。
2.瞭解公共理性結構的不同觀點與批評。
3.將課程所學結合到自身的研究。 
課程要求
 1.課前閱讀：須詳閱每週的指定閱讀文本，充分掌握相關論點之問題意識與理論主張，並撰寫論點摘要與提問。
2.課堂討論：針對文本內容、論證主張、疑惑不解之處或延伸問題進行討論。
3.期末報告：針對本課程之授課內容自選研究主題，撰寫學術性論文。 
預期每週課後學習時數
  
Office Hours
  
指定閱讀
 1.Gaus, G. F. (2003). Contemporary Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project. London; Thousand Oaks, California; New Delhi: SAGE Publications.
2.Gaus, G. F. (2011). The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3.Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4.Quong, J. (2014). “What is the Point of Public Reason,” Philosophical Studies 170, 3: 545-553.
5.Raz, J. (1990). “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 19, 1: 3-46.
6.Macedo, S. (1997). ‘‘In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases?’’ The American Journal of Jurisprudence 42, 1: 1-29.
7.Macedo, S. (2010). “Why Public Reason? Citizens’ Reasons and the Constitution of the Public Sphere,” Social Science Research Network.
8.Vallier, K. (2011). “On Jonathan Quong’s Sectarian Political Liberalism,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 11, 1: 175-194. 
參考書目
 1.Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
2.Rawls, J. (1996). ‘‘Introduction to the Paperback Edition,’’ in Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Pp. xxxvii-lxii.
3.Rawls, J. (1997). “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” The University of Chicago Law Review 64, 3: 765-807.
4.Sandel, M. J. (1998). Liberalism and the Limits of Justice: Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5.Quong, J. (2018). ‘‘Public Reason,’’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .
6.D’Agostino, F. (1996). Free Public Reason; Making it Up As We Go. New York: Oxford University Press.
7.Gaus, G, & Vallier, K. (2009). “The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry, and Political Institutions,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 35, 1: 51-76.
8.Vallier, K. (2014). Liberalism and Public Faith: Beyond Separation. New York: Routledge.
9.Vallier, K. (2016). “Public Justification vs Public Deliberation: The Case for Divorce,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45, 2: 139-158.
10.Billingham, P. (2016). “Convergence Justifications Within Political Liberalism: A Defence,” Res Publica 22, 2: 135-153.
11.Billingham, P. (2017). “Convergence Liberalism and the Problem of Disagreement Concerning Public Justification,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47, 4: 541-564.
12.Wall, S. (2013). “Public Reason and Moral Authoritarianism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 63, 250: 160-169.
13.Bohman, J. (2003). “Deliberative Toleration,” Political Theory 31, 3: 757–779.
14.Enoch, D. (2013). “The Disorder of Public Reason,” Ethics 123, 1: 141-176.
15.Enoch, D. (2015). “Against Public Reason,” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (Volume 1). D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne, & S. Wall (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 112-142.
16.Enoch, D. (2017). “Political Philosophy and Epistemology: The Case of Public Reason,” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (Volume 3). D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne, & S. Wall (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 132–165. 
評量方式
(僅供參考)
  
No.
項目
百分比
說明
1. 
 指定閱讀之摘要與提問 
25% 
  
2. 
 課堂討論表現 
25% 
  
3. 
 期末報告 
50% 
  
 
課程進度
週次
日期
單元主題
第1週
 9/17  問題意識與研究架構討論 
第2週
 9/24  Gaus, G. (2003). Contemporary Theories of Liberalism Pp. 177-231.
Chapter7: Rawls’s Political Liberalism.
Chapter8: Justificatory Liberalism and Adjudicative Democracy 
第3週
 10/01  中秋節（放假） 
第4週
 10/08  Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Pp. 1-36.
Chapter1: Social Morality.
Chapter2: Moral Authority among Free and Equal Persons.  
第5週
 10/15  Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Pp. 36-49, 232-257.
Chapter3: Evaluative Diversity and the Problem of Indeterminacy.
Chapter13: The Reason One Has.  
第6週
 10/22  Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Pp. 261-292.
Chapter14: On Modeling Public Justification.  
第7週
 10/29  Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason.. Pp. 292-333.
Chapter15: Proposals.
Chapter16: Evaluating Proposals and the Problem of Indeterminacy. 
第8週
 11/05  Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Pp. 334-370.
Chapter17: Arguments from Abstraction and the Claims of Agency. 
第9週
 11/12  Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Pp. 389-424.
Chapter19: Coordinating on a Morality.
Chapter20: The Evolution of Morality.  
第10週
 11/19  1.Macedo, S. (1997). ‘‘In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases?’’
2.Macedo, S. (2010). “Why Public Reason? Citizens’ Reasons and the Constitution of the Public Sphere.” Pp. 1-37. 
第11週
 11/26  1.Quong, J. (2014). “What is the Point of Public Reason.” Pp. 545-553.
2.Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Introduction. Pp. 1-11. 
第12週
 12/03  Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Pp. 108-136.
Chapter 4: Justification and Legitimacy. 
第13週
 12/10  Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Pp. 137-160.
Chapter5: A Question Internal to Liberal Theory.  
第14週
 12/17  Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Pp. 161-191.
Chapter6: The Role of an Overlapping Consensus. 
第15週
 12/24  Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Pp. 192-220.
Chapter7: Disagreement and Asymmetry.  
第16週
 12/31  Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Pp. 256-289.
Chapter9: The Scope and Structure of Public Reason.  
第17週
 1/07  Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Pp. 290-314.
Chapter10: Unreasonable Citizens. 
第18週
 1/14  Vallier, K. (2011). “On Jonathan Quong’s Sectarian Political Liberalism.” Pp. 175-194. / 期末綜合討論