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課程名稱 |
身體經驗的跨領域研究二
Interdisciplinary Investigations of Bodily Experiences (Ⅱ) |
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開課學期 |
109-2 |
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授課對象 |
文學院 哲學研究所 |
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授課教師 |
梁益堉 |
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課號 |
Phl7776 |
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課程識別碼 |
124 M7560 |
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班次 |
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學分 |
3.0 |
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全/半年 |
半年 |
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必/選修 |
選修 |
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上課時間 |
星期三2,3,4(9:10~12:10) |
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上課地點 |
哲研討室三 |
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備註 |
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。研究所：E領域。
大學部：(C)哲學專題群組。
總人數上限：10人 |
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Ceiba 課程網頁 |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1092Phl7776_IIBE2 |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
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課程大綱
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為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
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課程概述 |
這是一門關於「身體經驗」之進階的研究型課程，選課同學應先修過「身體經驗的跨領域研究一」。我們會深入探討許多涉及「身體經驗」的哲學與科學議題。例如：「身體歸屬感」與「經驗歸屬感」之間是否有必然關聯？「身體歸屬感」的可塑性有沒有極限？藉由視覺與觸覺的操弄，可不可能引發「擁有四隻手」的主觀經驗？「第一人稱觀點」與「第二人稱觀點」之間的關係是什麼？「身體位置感」與「自我位置感」是相同的主體經驗嗎？我們除了討論相關的哲學作品與認知神經科學的論文，也會嘗試設計實驗來研究各種「身體錯覺」。例如：自我觸碰錯覺、身體交換錯覺，以及我們最近在「神經科學與哲學研究室」設計的「四隻手錯覺」與新版的「全身錯覺」等。研究這些新議題將有助於瞭解身體與意識之間的複雜關係。 |
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課程目標 |
本課程有四項目標：第一，能瞭解與身體經驗相關的哲學問題。第二，學習設計實驗來從事跨領域研究。第三，學習如何仔細閱讀哲學與科學論文，並練習使寫作更為清晰。第四，對於一些重要議題能發展出自己的想法。 |
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課程要求 |
學生除了得花功夫研讀困難的哲學作品，在上課時參與討論，評估各種立場的論證，也需要在作業中提出自己的觀點，並加以辯護。 |
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
Readings will be selected from the following list |
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參考書目 |
1. Blanke, O., and Metzinger, T., Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood. Trends in cognitive sciences, 2009, 13(1), 7-13.
2. Blanke, O., Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2012, 13, 556-571.
3. Christoff, K., Cosmelli, D., Legrand, D., and Thompson, E., Specifying the self for cognitive neuroscience. Trends in cognitive sciences, 2011, 15(3), 104-112.
4. De Vignemont, F., “A Multimodal Conception of Bodily Awareness”, Mind, 2014, 123: 990-1020.
5. Ehrsson, H. H., How many arms make a pair? Perceptual illusion of having an additional limb. Perception, 2009, 38(2), 310-312.
6. Folegatti, A., Farne, A., Salemme, R., de Vignemont, F., The rubber hand illusion: Two’s a company, but three’s a crowd. Consciousness and cognition, 2012, 21(2), 779-812.
7. Froese, T., Iizuka, H., and Ikegami, T., Using minimal human-computer interfaces for studying the interactive development of social awareness. Frontiers in Psychology, 2014, 5, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01061
8. Fuchs, T., The phenomenology and development of social perspectives. Phenomenology and cognitive science, 2013, 12(4), doi: 10.1007/s11097-012-9267-x
9. Gallagher, S. (Ed.) The Oxford handbook of self. Oxford University Press, 2011.
10. Guterstam, A., Petkova, V. I., and Ehrsson, H. H., The illusion of owning a third arm. PLoS One, 2011, 6(2), e17208.
11. Legrand, D., Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives. Consciousness and cognition, 2007, 16(3), 583-599.
12. Legrand, D., Myself with No Body? Body, Bodily-Consciousness and Self-consciousness. In Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 2010, pp. 180-200. Springer Netherlands.
13. Liang, C., “Self-as-Subject and Experiential Ownership”, In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 2015, 24(T), 1-19. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
14. Liang, C., “Can Experiential Ownership Violate the Immunity Principle? —A Reply to Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung”, In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 2015, 24(R), 1-6. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
15. Liang, C.*, Chang, S. Y., Chen, W. Y., Huang, H. C., Lee, Y. T., “Body ownership and experiential ownership in the self-touching illusion”, Frontiers in Psychology: Consciousness Research, 2015, 5:1591, 1-13.
16. Maselli, A., and Slater, M., Sliding perspectives: dissociating ownership from self-location during full body illusions in virtual reality. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 2014, 8:693, 1-19.
17. Metzinger, T., Being No One. MIT Press, 2003.
18. Metzinger, T., Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: A brief summary with examples. In Banerjee & Chakrabarti (Eds.), Progress in Brain Research, 2008, 168, 215-246.
19. Peacocke, C., The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness. Oxford University Press, 2014.
20. Prosser, S., and Recanati, F. (Eds.) Immunity to error through misidentification: new essays. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
21. Serino, A., Alsmith, A., Costantini, M., Mandrigin, A., Tajadura-Jimenez, A., and Lopez, C., Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily self-consciousness. Consciousness and cognition, 2013, 22(4), 1239-1252.
22. Wittgenstein, L., The Blue and Brown Books, Harper & Row Publishers, 1958.
23. Zahn, R., Talazko, J., & Ebert, D., Loss of the Sense of Self-Ownership for Perceptions of Objects in a Case of Right Inferior Temporal, Parieto-Occipital and Precentral Hypometabolism. Psychopathology, 2008, 41, 397-402. |
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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No. |
項目 |
百分比 |
說明 |
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1. |
Discussion |
10% |
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2. |
Presentations |
40% |
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3. |
Final Paper |
50% |
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週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
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第1週 |
2/24 |
Introduction: bodily experiences and philosophical issues |
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第2週 |
3/03 |
Philosophical views
1. De Vignemont, F. (2014). “A Multimodal Conception of Bodily Awareness”, Mind, 123: 990-1020.
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第3週 |
3/10 |
Philosophical views
1. Selected portions from Peacocke, C. (2014). The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
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第4週 |
3/17 |
Body-part illusions
1. Ehrsson, H. H. (2009). How many arms make a pair? Perceptual illusion of having an additional limb. Perception, 38(2), 310-312.
2. Guterstam, A., Petkova, V. I., and Ehrsson, H. H. (2011). The illusion of owning a third arm. PLoS One, 6(2), e17208.
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第5週 |
3/24 |
Full-body illusions
1. Blanke, O., and Metzinger, T. (2009). Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood. Trends in cognitive sciences, 13(1), 7-13.
2. Legrand, D. (2010). Myself with No Body? Body, Bodily-Consciousness and Self-consciousness. In Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (pp. 180-200). Springer Netherlands.
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第6週 |
3/31 |
Pilot study 1 |
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第7週 |
4/07 |
Self-touching illusion
1. Liang, C.*, Chang, S. Y., Chen, W. Y., Huang, H. C., Lee, Y. T. (2015). “Body ownership and experiential ownership in the self-touching illusion”, Frontiers in Psychology: Consciousness Research, 5:1591, 1-13.
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第8週 |
4/14 |
Body-location and self-location
1. Serino, A., Alsmith, A., Costantini, M., Mandrigin, A., Tajadura-Jimenez, A., and Lopez, C. (2013). Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily self-consciousness. Consciousness and cognition, 22(4), 1239-1252.
2. Maselli, A., and Slater, M. (2014). Sliding perspectives: dissociating ownership from self-location during full body illusions in virtual reality. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8:693, 1-19.
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第9週 |
4/21 |
First presentation |
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第10週 |
4/28 |
Pilot study 2 |
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第11週 |
5/05 |
Second-person perspective
1. Fuchs, T. (2013). The phenomenology and development of social perspectives. Phenomenology and cognitive science, 12(4), doi: 10.1007/s11097-012-9267-x
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第12週 |
5/12 |
Second-person perspective
1. Froese, T., Iizuka, H., and Ikegami, T. (2014). Using minimal human-computer interfaces for studying the interactive development of social awareness. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01061
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第13週 |
5/19 |
Pilot study 3 |
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第14週 |
5/26 |
Experiential ownership
1. Legrand, D. (2007). Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives. Consciousness and cognition, 16(3), 583-599.
2. Christoff, K., Cosmelli, D., Legrand, D., and Thompson, E. (2011). Specifying the self for cognitive neuroscience. Trends in cognitive sciences, 15(3), 104-112.
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第15週 |
6/02 |
Pilot study 4 |
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第16週 |
6/09 |
Philosophical views
1. Liang, C. (2015). “Self-as-Subject and Experiential Ownership”, In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 24(T), 1-19. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
2. Liang, C. (2015). “Can Experiential Ownership Violate the Immunity Principle? —A Reply to Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung”, In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 24(R), 1-6. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
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第17週 |
6/16 |
Second presentation - Last Class |
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