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Course title |
Political Risk Analysis of Domestic Luxury Consumption in China |
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Semester |
111-1 |
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Designated for |
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE |
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Instructor |
MIN-HUA HUANG |
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Curriculum Number |
PS5714 |
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Curriculum Identity Number |
322EU2500 |
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Class |
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Credits |
2.0 |
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Full/Half
Yr. |
Half |
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Required/
Elective |
Elective |
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Time |
Tuesday 3,4(10:20~12:10) |
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Remarks |
Restriction: juniors and beyond
The upper limit of the number of students: 90.
The upper limit of the number of non-majors: 80. |
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Course introduction video |
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Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning |
Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning |
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Course Syllabus
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Please respect the intellectual property rights of others and do not copy any of the course information without permission
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Course Description |
This course applies political risk analysis to explain the linkage between luxury consumption and anti-corruption movement in China. It aims to cultivate students to develop a deep insight and understanding about how economic behavior and commercial market are affected by political dynamics in one-party regime like China. The anti-corruption campaigns under analysis covers the two decades under the Hu-Wen and Xi-Li regime from 2003 to 2022, and the varieties of luxury goods that are commonly used to capitalize illegal gains. Quantitative methods are introduced to apply as analytical tools, such like the game theory and regression methods. Students are trained to be familiar with the format and content of political risk assessment and understand how politics affects society and business in China. |
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Course Objective |
There are five objectives in this course as follows:
1. Understand the nature of the anti-corruption campaign and its importance in China.
2. Understand the linkage between luxury consumption and corruptive deeds.
3. Learn how to conduct political risk analysis with scientific tools.
4. Explain how public spending is associated with the anti-corruption movement and how it is related to changing patterns of perceived political risk under different regimes.
5. Explain how Chinese domestic luxury market is affected by politics |
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Course Requirement |
1. Attendance and discussion (20%)
2. Mid-term short essay (a two-page case study on corruption, due at week 10, 30%)
3. Final report (within five pages, on anti-corruption campaigns, due at week 16, 50%) |
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Student Workload (expected study time outside of class per week) |
1 hour |
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Office Hours |
Appointment required. Note: By appointment |
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Designated reading |
1. Ang, Yuen Yuen. (2020). China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
2. Kautz, Carolin. (2020). Power Struggle or Strengthening the Party: Perspectives on Xi Jinping’s Anticorruption Campaign. Journal of Chinese Political Science 25(3): 501-511.
3. Kuo, Chi-Hsien, Min-Hua Huang, and Ching-I Huang. (2022). The Anti-Corruption Campaign, Luxury Consumption, and Regime Trust in China: Changing Patterns of Perceived Political Risk and Their Consequences. Journal of Contemporary China, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2022.2071895.
4. McKinsey & Company. (2017). China Luxury Report 2017: Chinese Luxury Consumers: The 1 Trillion Renminbi Opportunity. Marketing & Sales Practice Report.
5. McKinsey & Company. (2019). China Luxury Report 2019: How Young Chinese Consumers Are Reshaping Global Luxury. Study Report.
6. Qian, Nancy, and Jaya Wen. (2015). The Impact of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign on Luxury Imports in China, working paper.
7. Shirk, Susan L. (2018). China in Xi’s “New Era”: The Return to Personalistic Rule. Journal of Democracy 29(2): 22-36.
8. Veblen, Thorstein. (1912). The Theory of the Leisure Class, Now York: Macmillan Company.
9. Wang, Peng, and Xia Yan. (2020). Bureaucratic Slack in China: The Anti-Corruption Campaign and the Decline of Patronage Networks in Developing Local Economies. The China Quarterly 243: 611-634.
10. Wedeman, Andrew. (2005). Anticorruption Campaigns and the Intensification of Corruption in China. Journal of Contemporary China 14(1): 93-116.
11. Yuen, Samson. (2014). Disciplining the Party: Xi Jinping's Anti-corruption Campaign and Its Limits. China Perspectives 2014(3): 41-47.
12. Yuji Miura. (2022). The Reality of “Common Prosperity” Advocated by the Xi Jinping Administration. Pacific Business and Industries 22(83): 1-44.
13. Zhu, Jiangnan, Qi Zhang, and Zhikuo Liu. (2017). Eating, Drinking, and Power Signaling in Institutionalized Authoritarianism: China’s Antiwaste Campaign Since 2012. Journal of Contemporary China 26(105): 337-352. |
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References |
1. Wang, Luyao. (2016). The Impacts of Anti-Corruption on Economic Growth in China. Modern Economy 7: 109-117.
2. Li, Ling. (2019). Politics of Anticorruption in China: Paradigm Change of the Party’s Disciplinary Regime 2012–2017. Journal of Contemporary China 28(115): 47-63.
3. Kazuko, Kojima. (2020). Politics under Xi Jinping: Centralization and its Implications. Public Policy Review 16(3): 1-21.
4. Yang, Yang, Caiping Wang, and Honggang Xu. (2021). Challenge or Chance? Understanding the Impact of Anti-Corruption Campaign on China’s Hotel Industry. Tourism Economics, forthcoming. https://doi.org/10.1177/13548166211001589.
5. Belk, Russell W. (1988). Possessions and the Extended Self. Journal of Consumer Research 15(2): 139-168.
6. Li, Zongyu. (2021). Luxury During the Epidemic: The Rise of the Chinese Market. Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research 203: 1744-1748.
7. Brown, Kerry. (2018). The Anti-corruption Struggle in Xi Jinping’s China: An Alternative Political Narrative. Asian Affairs 49(1): 1-10.
8. Jia, Ruixue, Masayuki Kudamatsu, David Seim. (2015). Political Selection in China: The Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance. Journal of the European Economic Association 13(4): 631-668.
9. Osburg, John. (2018). Making Business Personal: Corruption, Anti-corruption, and Elite Networks in Post-Mao China. Current Anthropology 59: S149–S159.
10. Wang, Xiaolu, and Wing T. Woo. (2011). The Size and Distribution of Hidden Household Income in China. Asian Economic Papers 10(1): 1–26.
11. Wang, Xiaobing. (2019). Regulation and Corruption in Transitional China. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies 17(1): 47–64. |
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Grading |
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Adjustment methods for students |
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Teaching methods |
Assisted by video, Provide students with flexible ways of attending courses |
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Assignment submission methods |
Extension of the deadline for submitting assignments |
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Exam methods |
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Others |
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Week |
Date |
Topic |
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Week 1 |
09/06/2022 |
Introduction: The scope of this course |
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Week 2 |
09/13/2022 |
The anti-corruption campaigns in China: The nature and importance in politics |
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Week 3 |
09/20/2022 |
Varieties of corruption: Overview of corruption behavior in China |
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Week 4 |
09/27/2022 |
Features of luxury consumption: Theory of conspicuous consumption |
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Week 5 |
10/04/2022 |
Chinese domestic luxury market: Review of the luxury market in China |
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Week 6 |
10/11/2022 |
The linkage of anti-corruption movement and luxury consumption: Case studies |
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Week 7 |
10/18/2022 |
Xi’s Anti-corruption campaign: Its legal framework and political agenda |
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Week 8 |
10/25/2022 |
Methodology of political risk analysis: How to apply scientific tools |
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Week 9 |
11/01/2022 |
A game-theoretical analysis on public spending of luxuries: Model setup |
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Week 10 |
11/08/2022 |
Hypothesis deduction: From equilibrium to research hypotheses |
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Week 11 |
11/15/2022 |
Statistical Analysis I: Panel regressions |
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Week 12 |
11/22/2022 |
Statistical Analysis II:：Hierarchical generalized-linear models |
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Week 13 |
11/29/2022 |
The rise and fall of the provincial luxury market: Views of factional politics |
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Week 14 |
12/06/2022 |
Other explanations: Political turmoil in Hong Kong |
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Week 15 |
12/13/2022 |
Common prosperity: Xi’s latest political initiative related to the Business |
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Week 16 |
12/20/2022 |
Wrap-up |
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