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Course title |
Microeconomic Theory (Ⅱ) |
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Semester |
109-2 |
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Designated for |
COLLEGE OF MANAGEMENT GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS |
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Instructor |
YI-HSUAN LIN |
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Curriculum Number |
ECON8008 |
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Curriculum Identity Number |
323EM0630 |
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Class |
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Credits |
4.0 |
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Full/Half
Yr. |
Half |
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Required/
Elective |
Required |
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Time |
Monday 7,8,9(14:20~17:20) Wednesday 9,10(16:30~18:20) |
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Remarks |
Restriction: MA students and beyond OR Restriction: Ph. D students
The upper limit of the number of students: 20. |
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Ceiba Web Server |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1092ECON8008_21S |
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Course introduction video |
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Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning |
Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning |
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Course Syllabus
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Please respect the intellectual property rights of others and do not copy any of the course information without permission
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Course Description |
We will study classic microeconomic theories. |
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Course Objective |
Students are expected to gain basic understanding about the most fundamental microeconomic models in which game theory find its major applications. These models are basic building blocks of more complicated economic models. |
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Course Requirement |
Students are required to submit homework assignments and to take one exam for each of the two sections. The details are found below or announced in class. |
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Student Workload (expected study time outside of class per week) |
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Office Hours |
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Designated reading |
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References |
Microeconomic Theory by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green is a classic reference. Advanced Microeconomic Theory by Jehle and Reny and A Course in Microeconomic Theory by Kreps are also graduate-level textbooks. Auction Theory by Krishna is a standard reference in auction and mechanism design.
Second half:
1. Mailath and Samuelson: Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press (2006) |
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Grading |
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Week |
Date |
Topic |
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Week 1 |
2/22,2/24 |
General Equilibrium |
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Week 3 |
3/08,3/10 |
General Equilibrium.
Lecture 1 slides are updated. If you have printed out the old version, now you only need to print out pages after 32. |
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Week 4 |
3/15,3/17 |
General Equilibrium under Uncertainty
Lecture 2 slides are updated. If you have printed out the old version, now you only need to print out pages after 31.
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Week 5 |
3/22,3/24 |
Social Choice |
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Week 6 |
3/29,3/31 |
Mechanism Design |
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Week 8 |
4/12,4/14 |
Mechanism Design: Lecture 4 slides are updated |
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Week 10 |
4/26,4/28 |
Repeated games with perfect monitoring |
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Week 11 |
5/03,5/05 |
Repeated games with imperfect monitoring |
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Week 12 |
5/10,5/12 |
Enforceability, self-generation |
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Week 13 |
5/17,5/19 |
Folk theorem, informativeness of the public signal |
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Week 14 |
5/24,5/26 |
Risk sharing, dynamic principal-agent models |
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Week 15 |
5/31,6/02 |
Stochastic games, stationary Markov equilibria |
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Week 16 |
6/07,6/09 |
Applications of stochastic games |
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Week 17 |
6/14,6/16 |
Dragonboat Festival |
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