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課程名稱 |
實驗經濟學一：行為賽局論
Experimental Economics I: Behavioral Game Theory |
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開課學期 |
112-2 |
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授課對象 |
社會科學院 經濟學系 |
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授課教師 |
王道一 |
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課號 |
ECON5112 |
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課程識別碼 |
323EU8110 |
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班次 |
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學分 |
3.0 |
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全/半年 |
半年 |
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必/選修 |
選修 |
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上課時間 |
星期二2,3,4(9:10~12:10) |
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上課地點 |
社科研608 |
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備註 |
本課程以英語授課。英文考試。
限學士班三年級以上 或 限碩士班以上 或 限博士班
總人數上限：32人
外系人數限制：4人 |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
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課程大綱
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課程概述 |
This is an upper division and graduate level course on experimental economics, focusing on behavioral game theory. The purpose is to introduce experimental economics to students so they can start their own research in this field. You are expected to write replication reports of research papers and present them. |
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課程目標 |
Specific goals of this course include:
1. Introduction to Experimental Economics: After this class, students are expected to be able to name several experiments performed in each fields of economics, and describe how the results affirm (or differ from) economic theory and/or field data.
2. Experimental Design: After this class, students are expected to understand how to design and run an experiment. Students can also write a research proposal that:
a. Proposes an economic experiment (with sample subject instructions), satisfying:
i. Real Incentives (so choices have real consequences),
ii. A Good Control Group (to compare with Treatment group),
iii. Random Assignment (to the Treatment and Control groups),
iv. No deception (to establish reputation so real incentives are believed).
b. Argues why should we care about this experiment and why the experiment is designed this way (compared to other possible designs), and,
c. Relates your experiment to existing literature (if any) and describes expected results and/or methods to analyze the data (or simulation results).
3. Evaluate Current Research: After this class, students are expected to develop the ability to read recent journal articles in experimental economics, and evaluate the quality of the papers. During class, students are expected to read assigned journal articles and book chapters and present one article in class. |
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課程要求 |
Intermediate microeconomics or game theory is the pre-requisite of this course. |
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
6 |
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Office Hours |
每週二 12:10~13:00 備註： Or by email appointment. |
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指定閱讀 |
1. Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press. (BGT)
2. Moffatt (2019), Experimetrics Lecture Notes for NTU mini-course. (EMT) |
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參考書目 |
1. Capra, Croson, Rigdon and Rosenblat, ed. (2020), Handbook of Experimental Game Theory, Edward Elgar Publishing.
2. Kagel and Roth, ed. (1995/2016), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 1 and Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, Princeton University Press (HEE1/2).
3. Holt (2019), Markets, Games and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction to Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press. (Holt; Undergraduate text)
4. Moffatt (2016), Experimetrics: Econometrics for Experimental Economics, Palgrave. |
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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No. |
項目 |
百分比 |
說明 |
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1. |
Homework |
40% |
Final quiz on weekly problem sets in BGT (5/28 in class). |
2. |
Estimation |
35% |
Form groups to perform experimetric estimations (submit via NTU COOL) and replicate assigned paper (due 6/4). |
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Presentation |
25% |
20-minute oral presentation of one research article (15%) and feedback to others (10%).
In lieu of oral presentation (15%) and replication report (20%), one may present and submit an experimental proposal (35%; <4 pages, due 6/4). |
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針對學生困難提供學生調整方式 |
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上課形式 |
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作業繳交方式 |
書面報告取代口頭報告 |
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考試形式 |
書面(口頭)報告取代考試 |
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其他 |
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週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
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第1週 |
2/20 |
Experimental Economics and Behavioral Game Theory (BGT, Ch.1; Holt; Wang)
Experimetrics and Power Analysis (EMT, Ch.1-2) |
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第2週 |
2/27 |
Risk and Time Preferences (Holt, Ch.3)
Basic Principles of Experimental Design (BGT, A1.2)
Estimation of Risk Aversion Parameter: Binary Lottery (EMT, Ch.3) |
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第3週 |
3/5 |
Social Preferences (BGT, Ch.2; HEE2, Ch.4; UG, DG, Trust; Lin-20)
Estimating Social Preferences/Ultimatum Game (EMT, Ch. 4) |
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第4週 |
3/12 |
Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium (BGT, Ch.3); Estimating QRE (Experimetrics, Ch.16) |
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第5週 |
3/19 |
Bargaining (BGT, Ch.4) |
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第6週 |
3/26 |
Dominant Solvable Games (BGT, Ch.5) |
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第7週 |
4/2 |
Multi-Agent Contracting (Guest Lecture by Eyal Winter)
Mini-Course in Multi-Agent Contracting (by Eyal Winter) [4/2-11] |
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第8週 |
4/9 |
Experimental Evidence of Multi-Agent Contracting (Guest Lecture: Eyal Winter) |
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第9週 |
4/16 |
Level-k Thinking (Crawford-13); Finite Mixture Models (EMT, Ch. 5) |
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第10週 |
4/23 |
Learning (BGT, Ch.6; HEE2, Ch.10) |
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第11週 |
4/30 |
Coordination (BGT, Ch.7) |
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第12週 |
5/7 |
Signaling/Reputation (BGT, Ch.8) |
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第13週 |
5/14 |
Research Paper Presentation |
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第14週 |
5/21 |
Replication Report Presentation |
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第15週 |
5/28 |
Final Quiz |
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第16週 |
6/4 |
Revised Replication Presentation and Replication Report Due |
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